Hampton Roads Versus Other
East Coast Container Ports

Sizing Up the Competition: Hampton Roads Versus
Other East Coast Container Ports
To reach a port we must sail, sometimes with the wind, and sometimes against it.
But we must not drift or lie at anchor.
– Oliver Wendell Holmes, 1809-1894

M

ore than 90 percent of the world’s international trade flows through ports such as the Port of Hampton Roads. Depending upon who is doing
the counting, the Port of Hampton Roads is responsible for 7 percent to 12 percent of our regional economic activity.
When our port prospers, Hampton Roads thrives; when it languishes, we visibly weaken.

This strong connection to our regional welfare provokes an
obvious question. How are we (and the port) situated with
respect to future developments? Will we benefit from the refashioning of
the Panama Canal? Can we compete capably with other East Coast ports? Are
there alternate strategies we should pursue? These are the topics we address in
this chapter.

A Bit of Background
In the past half-century, the nature of the commercial cargo transportation across
the oceans has changed dramatically. Until the 1950s, general cargo (a term
that excludes bulk cargo such as coal, liquids and grain) was handled as “breakbulk” cargo – it was placed on pallets and loaded/unloaded to and from ships
by means of on-board cranes. This was a slow, expensive, item-by-item, laborintensive process. Individual boxes containing everything from clothing to radios
were unloaded, one by one.
All this changed when Malcolm McLean, believing that individual pieces of
general cargo needed to be handled only twice – at their origin when stored
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in a standardized container box and at their final customer destination when
unloaded – purchased a small tanker company, renamed it Sealand and cleverly
adapted its ships to transport truck trailers. McLean’s efforts met with great success
when several major port organizations such as the U.S. Maritime Association,
the Federal Maritime Board and the International Standards Organization
spearheaded a worldwide compromise that standardized container sizes and
characteristics. Truck trailers soon were replaced by trailers without wheels and
general cargo rapidly began to be stored in standardized containers, generally
20 feet or 40 feet in length, without wheels. These became known as TEUs (20foot equivalent units) and FEUs (40-foot equivalent units).
On April 26, 1956, the first voyage of a Sealand containership occurred when
a vessel left Newark, N.J., for Puerto Rico. And in 1966, the first containerization
of international trade began with the voyage of a Sealand ship from the United
States to the Netherlands.
The advent of containerization demanded the redesign of ships and ports. Ships
transporting containers were redesigned without cranes aboard. Below decks,
cargo space was divided into cells to enhance the loading and unloading of
containers. Without cranes taking up room, the deck space now could be used
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to stack containers five high. This increased the container carrying capacity of
these ships by approximately 30 percent.
These developments required ports to invest in dockside cranes, various types of
infrastructure and mobile capital. Berths were redesigned so that containerships
could dock parallel to them for easier loading and unloading by dockside
cranes. Warehouses were removed and land was cleared for outdoor storage
of containers. Containers were stored on truck chassis or stacked on land one
upon another, several units high, depending upon available space of land and
the port’s style of operation.

Hampton Roads and Other
U.S. Container Ports

The third- and fourth-largest U.S. container ports are the ports of New York/
New Jersey and Savannah, with 15.6 percent and 7.8 percent, respectively, of
the TEU throughput of the 10 top-ranked U.S. container ports.
The Port of Hampton Roads is the sixth-largest U.S. container
port (but the third-largest East Coast container port) with 6.2
percent of the TEU throughput of the country’s major U.S.
container ports. The container ports of Miami, Jacksonville and Baltimore
(not shown in Graph 1) were the fifth-, sixth- and seventh-largest East Coast
container ports in 2008.
Relative port market shares have changed substantially over the past decade.
Table 1 reports growth rates in TEUs handled at the largest American ports
between 1998 and 2008. Among East Coast ports, New York/
New Jersey grew 113.5 percent over that time period, while

The 10 top-ranked container ports in the United States, ranked by TEU
throughput, are shown in Graph 1. Imported TEUs arrive by ship and leave a
port for an American location by means of truck, rail or barge. Alternatively,
exported TEUs arrive by truck, rail or barge and leave a port by ship for another
destination.
The two largest U.S. container ports are the West Coast ports
of Los Angeles and Long Beach (located very close to each
other, but separate organizations), with 23.4 percent and 19.4
percent, respectively, of the TEU throughput of the 10 topranked U.S. container ports. Together, these two ports handle
a whopping 42.8 percent of the total TEU throughput at the
major U.S. container ports. Most of these TEUs are related to Asian
trade. Many of the containerships calling at these two ports are “Post-Panamax”
ships, exceeding 5,000 TEUs in size, and are too large to transit the Panama
Canal as it currently is configured. Consequently, TEUs from Post-Panamax ships
that dock on the American West Coast, but have cargo destined for the eastern
region of the United States, are placed on double-stack railroad cars at the ports
and sent across country.
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Savannah grew an amazing 258.1 percent and in the process
passed Hampton Roads. At the other end of the spectrum, Charleston,
Port Everglades, Miami, Jacksonville and Baltimore grew much more slowly than
TEU traffic nationally. They rank among the losers in the rigorous competition for
TEU cargoes over the past decade. (Baltimore, however, has profitably focused
its attention on automobiles and roll-on, roll-off traffic, neither of which count as
TEUs.) Hampton Roads grew (66.4 percent), but this was only
slightly more than the national average (63.7 percent).
The 10 top-ranked U.S. container ports with respect to market share, (expressed
as a percentage) of TEUs imported from and exported to Asia only, appear in
Graph 2. The ports of Los Angeles and Long Beach are ranked first and second
in market share of imports from (at 30.9 percent and 23.4 percent, respectively)
and exports to Asia (at 24.7 percent and 21.1 percent, respectively) among
U.S. container ports. The two largest East Coast container ports, New York/New
Jersey and Savannah, are ranked third and fourth, respectively, in market share
(at 12 percent and 6.7 percent, respectively) of imports from Asia. The third- and
fourth-largest East Coast container ports, Hampton Roads and Charleston, are
ranked eighth and ninth, respectively, among U.S. container ports for imports to
(at 3.6 percent and 2.6 percent, respectively) and exports from (at 6 percent and
2.1 percent, respectively) Asia.

Table 1
Hot and Cold: Ranking U.S. Ports by Size (TEUs, 2008)
Port

Container
TEUs 2008

Percent Growth
Rate, 1998-2008

Los Angeles

7,849,985

132.4

Long Beach

6,350,125

55.0

New York/New Jersey

5,265,058

113.5

Savannah

2,616,126

258.1

Oakland

2.236.244

42.0

Hampton Roads

2,003,278

66.4

Tacoma

1,861,352

161.0

Houston

1,794,309

87.1

Seattle

1,704,492

10.4

San Juan

1,684,883

-15.4

Charleston

1,635,534

28.0

Port Everglades

985,095

39.9

Miami

828,349

1.7

Jacksonville

697,494

-8.0

Baltimore

612,887

25.9

42,827,594

63.7

U.S.

Sources: American Association of Port Authorities and the Old Dominion University Economic Forecasting Project
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Graph 1
TEN TOP-RANKED U.S. CONTAINER PORTS (Teu throughput in 1,000s) in 2008
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Graph 2
u.s. container port market share of teus from and to asia (2008)
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The Challenges Facing
East Coast Container Ports
The Matter of Size
Since 1996, the size of the largest containership in worldwide service has more
than doubled. Fourteen years ago, the largest containership available was the
Regina Maersk, with a carrying capacity of 6,000 TEUs. By 2005, HapagLloyd’s Colombo Express’ carrying capacity was 8,750 TEUs. And by 2007,
the Emma Maersk had a carrying capacity of 13,000 TEUs.
Let’s provide some perspective. The Emma Maersk is 1,302 feet long and
184 feet wide, with a draft of more than 50 feet. By comparison, the U.S.
Navy’s largest aircraft carrier is only 1,220 feet long and 132 feet wide, with
a draft of 39 feet. Today’s containerships are giants and those now on order
will be able to carry more than 14,000 TEUs. By 2012, only 30 percent of
containerships will account for 64 percent of the TEU carrying capacity of all
containerships in world service. Hence, there are tremendous economies of
scale with respect to ship size, where container traffic is concerned. Simply put,
it is more cost-effective to operate huge TEU-bearing ships.
The dramatically increased size of containerships in worldwide service places
pressure on ports to increase: 1) water depths in entrance channels and
alongside berths; 2) channel widths that provide sufficient ship turning circles;
3) the use of larger-sized dockside container cranes, with a longer outreach,
loading capacity and lift height; 4) terminal storage capacity; and 5) truck and
railroad facilities that service the larger ships. However, it is fair to say that the
capacities of most East Coast container ports have lagged behind the increase
in the size of containerships.

The Need to Improve Operational Efficiency
Larger containerships also place pressure on ports to become more efficient
in their operations – i.e., to provide faster ship turnaround times (for example,
by increasing the number of container moves per hour to and from a berthed
containership by a ship-to-shore crane). While huge ships may be more cost-

effective in transporting TEUs across the oceans, the reverse often can be true
once the vessels reach a port. Simply put, it is difficult for any port to handle
13,000 TEUs quickly. More cranes are required to work larger-sized ships, and
there are physical and planning challenges associated with serving larger ships
that are not present with smaller ships.
The goal is to minimize “in port” time so that the larger ships can spend more
time at sea and take advantage of their efficiency there. Hence, there is great
pressure to increase the number of containers moved per hour to reduce labor
costs (usually based on hours rather than the number of TEUs moved) and
equipment costs.

Panama Canal Expansion
In 2006, the voters of Panama approved a $5.25 billion plan to expand and
modernize the Panama Canal, with an expected completion date of 2014. Two
new lock facilities are being constructed, one on the Atlantic Ocean side and
the other on the Pacific Ocean side of the canal. Also, navigational channels
are being widened to at least 280 meters in their straight sections and 366
meters in their turns. This will allow previously impossible channel passings
between Post-Panamax ships moving in opposite directions. Further, the canal is
being dredged to accommodate ship drafts of up to 50 feet. The expansion will
allow Post-Panamax containerships up to 12,500 TEUs in size to pass through
the canal.
The Panama Canal expansion will benefit East Coast ports at
the expense of West Coast ports. Post-Panamax containerships
that previously called at West Coast ports (since they were too
large to transit the Panama Canal) now will be able to transit
the expanded canal and call at East Coast ports. Forecasts by the
Panama Canal Authority predict that the percentage of containerized cargo
from Northeast Asia passing through the canal destined for East Coast ports will
increase with (or decrease without) the expansion from 38 percent in 2005 to
44 (36) percent, 46 (29) percent and 49 (23) percent in 2015, 2020 and
2025, respectively.
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However, these forecasts do not take into account possible increases in canal
tolls. Panama will have to pass on the cost of its canal expansion, and if its rate
increases turn out to be significant, a large share of the cost savings from using
the all-water Panama Canal service rather than the more expensive intermodal
rail service from California ports to the U.S. East Coast will be lost. Currently, a
Panamax ship carrying 2,000 TEUs pays a toll of $250,000 simply to transit the
canal. It remains to be seen how much this will increase.

Adapting to All-Water Suez Canal Services
An alternate way to ship cargo from North Asia to the U.S. East Coast is via
the Suez Canal, which joins the Mediterranean Sea and the Gulf of Suez.
However, this route takes a week longer than going through the Panama Canal.
Further, because of the greater distance involved, container shipping lines that
wish to exercise this option must deploy a greater number of ships to maintain
weekly service through the Suez Canal. Ten containerships may be needed for
a weekly service from Asia via the Suez Canal, versus only eight ships via the
Panama Canal. Nevertheless, if Panama Canal rates rise too much,
shipping companies will shift to the Suez Canal route, provided
political instability in the Middle East does not discourage such
a development.
Meanwhile, containership lines (especially those calling at U.S. West Coast
ports) have been re-evaluating their services and have introduced “port-to-port”
rate structures for their customers. This means that shippers are responsible for
the inland transportation of international cargo rather than the “door-to-door”
rates that apply when shipping lines such as Maersk are responsible for inland
transportation of international cargo.

A Closer Look at the
Competition
How do the major East Coast ports compare in terms of the terminals they have
available to serve ships coming to and going from the United States? Table 2
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provides that information, which we will now utilize to focus upon the competitive
positions of each of these ports.

Port of New York and New Jersey
The Port of New York and New Jersey, which has grown much more rapidly
than the U.S. average over the past decade, has six marine terminals – three
that handle only containers and three that handle containers as well as other
commodities (see Table 2). More than 75 percent of the cargo in the Port of
New York and New Jersey emanates from, or is distributed to, locations within a
200-mile radius of the port.
TABLE 2
THE MARINE TERMINALS OF EAST COAST PORTS
Containers

Containers/
Other

Other

New York &
New Jersey

3

3

---

Savannah

1

---

1

Hampton Roads

3

1

---

Charleston

2

1

2

Baltimore

1

1

2

Port

The Port of New York and New Jersey has a channel depth of 45 feet, soon to
be dredged to 50 feet (see Graph 3). There is on-dock rail service at multiple
piers. An express rail facility allows railroads to combine railcars from all the
port’s on-dock rail facilities to form lengthy trains. The express rail service also
allows the port to compete for cargo in Midwest markets, against Halifax and
Montreal in Canada and East Coast container ports as far south as the Port of
Savannah.
New York/New Jersey’s ability to compete with other East Coast container ports
will be enhanced upon the completion of Norfolk Southern’s “Crescent Corridor”
intermodal rail route, which will provide larger rail tunnels that offer more
direct double-stack container rail service between New York/New Jersey and
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Memphis. New York/New Jersey is fortunate to be served by three railroads –
Norfolk Southern, CSX and Canadian-Pacific Railway.

unionized ILA dockworkers). This reduces the labor costs incurred by the Port of
Savannah in providing services to shipping lines and shippers.

One of New York/New Jersey’s major advantages is its location. Of the large
U.S. East Coast ports, it is the closest, in terms of distance, to Western and
Northern European ports such as Hamburg, Antwerp and London. Hence, it
will always have a cost advantage over other East Coast ports with respect to
Western and Northern European cargoes, at least in terms of time and distance.
What happens to such cargoes on land, of course, is a different matter, and
some of New York/New Jersey’s advantage is dissipated by the port itself.

Container marine terminals often exhibit economies of scale – that is, the
average cost per container handling by a terminal declines as the number of
containers increases. Thus, Savannah’s large Garden City Terminal incurs lower
unit costs per TEU handled than smaller-sized terminals at other East Coast ports.
Presumably, this enables Savannah to underprice unionized competitors such as
Hampton Roads, Baltimore and New York/New Jersey.

An important disadvantage of the Port of New York and New Jersey is the
Bayonne Bridge, under which nearly all traffic into the port must travel. The
bridge has only a 151-foot vertical clearance above waterline. This poses
an obstacle for larger-sized Post-Panamax containerships moving to and from
the port. Also, labor relations within the Port of New York and New Jersey
occasionally have been tense, and this port faces significant restrictions on its
ability to hire new and replacement International Longshoremen’s Association
(ILA) dockworkers.

Port of Savannah
The Port of Savannah boasts only one container terminal, the Garden City
Terminal, but its 1,200 acres make it the largest container terminal in North
America. It also has a non-container terminal, the Ocean Terminal, that handles
break-bulk and roll-on, roll-off cargo. However, it has a channel depth of only
42 feet, though the channel soon will be dredged to 48 feet. It is the largest
port near Atlanta. Twenty percent of its throughput is handled by rail and it has
close access to Interstate highways 16 and 95.
Savannah is a relatively efficient port. One critical measure of operational
efficiency is the average number of containers a port moves to and from ships
per hour. Savannah’s ship-to-shore cranes average 37 container moves per hour
(see Graph 4). This is a rate about 20 percent higher than that of the Port of
Hampton Roads.

The Bayonne Bridge Problem: Ships seeking to call at
the Port of New York and New Jersey must pass under
the Bayonne Bridge, which at lowest water level is only
151 feet above the surface. Larger ships today often tower
175 feet above waterline. Hence, in order to pass under
the Bayonne Bridge today, these larger ships either must
fold down their antenna masts, take on ballast or wait
for a low tide. Ships reaching 225 feet above waterline
are on the horizon and the “new” Panama Canal, with its
ability to accommodate much larger ships, is scheduled
for completion in 2014. This presents the Port of New
York and New Jersey with an existential challenge. If it
replaces the bridge, this could take more than 10 years;
if it jacks up the bridge, this could take seven or eight
years; if it constructs a tunnel, this could take 15 years.
Any of these remedies will cost billions. By comparison,
any problems at the Port of Hampton Roads seem minor.

Like Virginia, Georgia is a right-to-work state. As a result, non-unionized state
employees operate ship-to-shore cranes and interchange gates (as opposed to
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Graph 3
channel depths of u.s. east coast container ports (in feet)
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Savannah led all U.S. ports in TEU growth between 1998 and
2008. Without question, this has been good for Savannah and the state of
Georgia. However, we must note that moving TEUs is not the only way a port
can prosper. On the East Coast, Baltimore has performed reasonably well
despite some locational disadvantages by focusing upon non-TEU traffic such
as imported automobiles. Other ports have done well by concentrating upon
attracting related manufacturing and distribution facilities.
There are three reasons for Savannah’s ascendancy. First, it has demonstrated
its ability to attract large retail shippers that have invested in regional distribution
centers (RDCs) close to the port. Frankie Lau of the Orient Overseas Container
Line, quoted in The Virginian-Pilot on May 2, 2010, noted, “It is not a decision
by the shipping line as to where we want to route this cargo. It’s basically the
customer’s choice.” And, the customers in question here are large retail shippers
such as Walmart, Target and Home Depot, which Savannah has successfully
courted.
Second, the unbundling of containers (loading containers with a variety of
commodities from import containers for direct delivery to retail stores) in RDCs
close to Savannah has provided transportation cost savings to large retail
shippers. Savannah has demonstrated the ability to mix and match different types
of cargo efficiently.
Third, Savannah has good rail connections from the port to the Norfolk Southern
North/South Trunk Line, the Heartland Corridor and the East-West Land Bridge
that carries cargo to and from Los Angeles. Savannah has little or no cost
disadvantage compared to Hampton Roads in terms of cargoes
destined for Chicago, and its connections to the West Coast are
superior to Hampton Roads (and most other East Coast ports).
Looking forward, the Port of Savannah will benefit from the
opening of the “new” Panama Canal in 2014. It is the closest
large port to the canal and seems poised to reduce Hampton
Roads to a distant third place among East Coast ports.
The Port of Savannah’s “focus on retail” approach to increasing its cargo
throughput began with the Savannah Economic Development Authority’s
development of the Crossroads Industrial Park about five miles from the port’s
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Garden City Terminal. The presence of Home Depot and Pier 1 Imports near
the port at that time was a catalyst for other large retailers to locate RDCs near
Savannah. More than 220 RDCs now exist that handle containers relating to
the Port of Savannah. This reflects strong collaboration among the Georgia Port
Authority (GPA), the state of Georgia, economic development agencies within
the state and retailers. The state of Georgia has provided economic incentives to
Interstate16 corridor counties for the establishment of RDCs. Further, a GPA Client
Relations Center that was created in 2001 offers a single contact for shippers
utilizing the port; it receives 600 phone calls each day from port shippers.
It is not by accident that the Port of Savannah has grown
approximately four times as fast as the Port of Hampton Roads
over the past decade. Unless Hampton Roads improves its
competitive position, this trend is destined to continue.

Port of Hampton Roads
The Port of Hampton Roads consists of the three state marine terminals of the Port
of Virginia – Norfolk International Terminals (NIT), Portsmouth Marine Terminal
(PMT) and Newport News Marine Terminal (NNMT) – plus the privately owned
APM Terminal of Virginia (APM). NIT and PMT are dedicated to handling
containers, while NNMT handles break-bulk, roll-on, roll-off and bulk cargoes.
APM is a modern, technologically sophisticated container terminal located in
Portsmouth.
In summer 2010, the Virginia Port Authority signed an agreement to lease APM’s
Portsmouth terminal for 20 years at a cost that likely will approach $1.4 billion.
The terminal handled 427,000 TEUs in 2009, but is capable of much higher
rates of activity.
In addition, a new Craney Island Marine Terminal (CIMT) may be
constructed in three phases over the next 20-25 years at a cost
of $2.2 billion. The first phase could begin in 2011. When all
phases are completed, CIMT will have a capacity of 2.5 million
TEUs. (The Port of Hampton Roads’ total throughput now is
slightly less than this.)
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With a channel depth of 50 feet, our port is the deepest of any East Coast
container ports and will be dredged to 55 feet. Any additional dredging beyond
55 feet is questionable because of the tunnels that transverse Hampton Roads.
Unlike the Port of New York and New Jersey, the Port of Hampton Roads is not
restricted by bridge heights. Thirty percent of its throughput is handled by rail. It
has on-dock rail service at the NIT and APM terminals. The port is served by two
railroads, Norfolk Southern and CSX.
Hampton Roads seeks to handle discretionary cargo destined for the country’s
Northeast and Midwest regions and it has promoted improvements in rail service
from the port to these areas. In particular, it has championed the Heartland Rail
Corridor project (expected completion in 2010), a Norfolk Southern intermodal
rail route that will reduce the distance to Chicago from 1,264 miles to 1,031
miles. This route, which heads west via Columbus, Ohio, requires that 28 rail
tunnels in Virginia, West Virginia and Kentucky be heightened so that the route
can handle double-stack container rail cars.
Some believe the Heartland Corridor will be a “game changer”
for Hampton Roads. Jon DeCesare, of World Class Logistics
Consulting, asserts, “If you look at the East Coast, Norfolk’s
in the strongest position” (The Virginian-Pilot, May 2, 2010).
If he is correct, this bodes well for Hampton Roads and the
Commonwealth of Virginia. However, given Savannah’s
distance advantage to the Panama Canal, its primo location at
one end of the East-West Land Bridge, and its well-developed
relationships with RDC customers such as Walmart, this is
hardly a foregone conclusion.
The Port of Hampton Roads also may benefit from the National Gateway
intermodal rail route that is being developed by CSX. This project, a publicprivate partnership, will develop the Interstate 81, Interstate 70 and Interstate
76 (Pennsylvania Turnpike) corridors between Virginia, Washington, D.C.,
Pennsylvania and northwest Ohio.
On the negative side of the ledger, ship-to-shore cranes in the Port of Hampton
Roads average only between 28 and 35 container moves per hour, making it
less efficient than a port such as Savannah. However, the APM Terminal facility
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the Virginia Port Authority recently leased is much more efficient and might be
capable of serving 40 containers per hour. Even so, this will reduce cargo going
through terminals such as the PMT and currently it is doubtful that increased breakbulk and roll-on/roll-off cargo will substitute for container traffic there.
While 80 RDCs throughout Virginia are affiliated with the Port
of Hampton Roads, this is many fewer than the comparable
220 for Savannah. Nevertheless, a positive note was sounded
in this regard recently when CenterPoint Properties announced
it will construct a warehouse in Suffolk, 20 miles from NIT.

Port of Charleston
The Port of Charleston, whose TEU throughput stagnated and increased at
less than one-half the national rate between 1998 and 2008, has five marine
terminals. Two are dedicated to handling containers (North Charleston Terminal
and the Wando Welch Terminal), one to handling containers and break-bulk
cargoes (Columbus Street Terminal), and two (Union Pier Terminal and the
Veterans Terminal) to handling cargoes other than containers. The Union Pier
Terminal handles break-bulk and roll-on/roll-off cargoes, while the Veterans
Terminal handles bulk, break-bulk and roll-on/roll-off cargoes. The Port of
Charleston is developing a new container terminal on a former U.S. Navy base
that will have a capacity of 1.4 million TEUs when completed in 2014.
The Port of Charleston has a channel depth of 45 feet and benefits from close
access to Interstate 95. State employees (as in the case of Port of Savannah)
operate ship-to-shore cranes and interchange gates rather than ILA dockworkers,
thus reducing costs and making the port more price-competitive to users. Its shipto-shore cranes average 40 container moves per hour, the highest rate among
large East Coast ports.
Unlike the Port of Savannah, the Port of Charleston has more than one marine
terminal in which containers are handled. However, like New York/ New Jersey,
Charleston has a bridge under which ships must pass. Charleston’s Ravenel
Bridge has a 186-foot vertical clearance and this does not pose an obstacle for
larger-sized Post-Panamax containerships, unlike the 151-foot clearance of the
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Bayonne Bridge at the Port of New York and New Jersey. However, larger ships
now on the drawing boards will not be able to pass under this span.

Port of Baltimore
The Port of Baltimore has four marine terminals – the MIT Seagirt, dedicated to
handling only containers; the Dundalk Marine Terminal, handling containers,
roll-on, roll-off and break-bulk cargoes; the North Locust Point Marine Terminal,
handling grain cargoes; and the South Locust Point Marine Terminal, handling
cruise passengers. TEU throughput via these terminals, however, expanded at
only about 40 percent of the national rate between 1998 and 2008. Slowly,
inexorably, the Port of Baltimore appears to be losing the competitive TEU battle
against other East Coast ports. However, as noted above, it has nonetheless
performed reasonably well by focusing its attention on non-TEU cargoes such as
automobiles imported into the United States.
The port has a channel depth of 45 feet (as do the Port of New York and New
Jersey and the Port of Charleston), but is scheduled to be dredged to 50 feet.
Unlike the Port of Hampton Roads, the Port of Baltimore handles relatively little
discretionary cargo. The port’s ship-to-shore cranes average 36 container moves
per hour. Like the Port of New York and New Jersey and the Port of Savannah,
Baltimore is near large consumer markets – the third-largest U.S. consumer
market when one includes the Baltimore, Philadelphia and Washington, D.C.,
metro areas. This is advantageous and can help overcome cost disadvantages.
Nevertheless, the Port of Baltimore suffers from three
disadvantages relative to the Port of Hampton Roads. First,
the ships it serves must pass by the Port of Hampton Roads;
Baltimore is an additional 250-mile, 10-hour trek up the
Chesapeake Bay. Second, even though Baltimore is served both by Norfolk
Southern and CSX railroads, the rail links to the port have double-stack rail
restrictions that obviate the possibility of certain shipments and cargoes being
moved via rail. Third, Baltimore’s labor relations and bureaucratic structure
sometimes have been problematic.

Fluctuations in Port
Throughput
There are three key actors connected to cargoes moving in and out of any port:
(1) transportation carriers such as shipping lines and railroads; (2) shippers
who want to move goods; and (3) the port itself. Let’s focus on the port. Ports
are vitally interested in increasing their cargo throughput and/or reducing
fluctuations in their throughput. Two obvious ways to address these desires
involve increasing the number of port calls made by carrier ships and vehicles
(carrying cargo) and increasing the amount of cargo that shippers transport in
and out of the port.
To these ends, ports can enter into long-term contracts with carriers to call at
the port (the “carrier customer” approach) and/or provide incentives for large
retail container shippers to build distribution centers in the vicinity of the port
(the “shipper customer” approach). In the carrier customer approach, the carrier
determines the ports where its ships and vehicles will call. The focus of a port
here is upon influencing carriers such as Maersk. Under the shipper customer
approach, the shipper determines the ports where carrier ships and vehicles
transporting its cargo will call. The focus of a port here is upon shippers and
retailers such as Walmart.
Virginia International Terminals (VIT), which operates the Port
of Virginia’s marine terminals of the Port of Hampton Roads,
has focused on the carrier customer approach to increasing its
TEU throughput and reducing fluctuations in its TEU throughput
over time. VIT has entered into 10-year contracts with a
number of shipping lines to call at the port and provide a
minimum number of containers per time period. By contrast, the
Port of Savannah has focused on the shipper customer approach. The Port of
Savannah has 220 regional distribution centers compared to 80 RDCs for the
Port of Hampton Roads.
When a port focuses on the carrier customer approach, it becomes highly
sensitive to the wishes of carriers. For example, if carriers choose larger-sized
ships that require ports with deeper channel drafts, such ports will be receptive
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to providing deep drafts to accommodate these ships. Because the Port of
Hampton Roads has the deepest channel draft (50 feet) of any port on the East
Coast, it is not surprising that it has tended to focus on the carrier customer
approach to business. Alternatively, it is not surprising that the Port of Savannah
has focused on the shipper customer approach because it has the smallest
channel draft (42 feet) of any of the East Coast ports we depicted in Graph 3.
The carrier customer approach to increasing TEU throughput and reducing
fluctuations in TEU throughput over time for a port has the advantage of
generating discretionary cargo that could travel via several different ports.
However, this means that such a port is more dependent on efficient intermodal
transportation service in moving discretionary cargo to and from distant inland
markets. In the case of Hampton Roads, these inland markets range from
Pittsburgh, Cleveland, Indianapolis and Chicago to Raleigh-Durham,
Memphis and St. Louis.
The Heartland Corridor intermodal rail route advantageously
addresses some of these concerns for the Port of Hampton
Roads. However, the absence of a “third crossing,” the twolane nature of the Midtown and Downtown tunnels, the twolane nature of I-64 in the direction of Richmond and the failure
of the Commonwealth to upgrade Route 460 south of the James
River can only be recorded as disadvantages.
Alternatively, under the shipper customer approach, a port where big retailer
shippers have constructed near-port RDCs (as is true for the Port of Savannah), an
efficient intermodal transportation service for moving cargo to and from distant
inland markets is relatively less important. Cargoes travel much shorter distances
and often not via rail. Only 18 percent of the port throughput for the Port of
Savannah is handled by rail versus 30 percent for the Port of Hampton Roads.
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Private vs. Public Operation? The nation’s largest ports
(New York/New Jersey, Los Angeles and Long Beach) largely
are operated by private, profit-making concerns, an option
now being considered in Virginia. Many of the smaller ports,
such as Savannah, are operated by public organizations. The
Port of Virginia is operated on an interesting and oft-praised
hybrid basis that combines aspects of private and public
operation. Which is the preferred way to go? That’s not clear,
but it is a hotly debated topic in Virginia and elsewhere, as
the 2005-06 controversy over Dubai Ports World revealed.
Regardless, more than 80 percent of all ports in the United
States currently are managed by foreign operators.

Final Thoughts
Over the past decade, it appears that two West Coast container locations have
emerged from the pack and now dominate TEU activity – Los Angeles/Long
Beach and Tacoma. Other West Coast ports have been left in their dust.
On the East Coast, New York/New Jersey and Savannah have begun to put
significant distance between them and other ports, including Hampton Roads,
at least where TEUs are concerned. While the game is far from decided, it
appears that Hampton Roads will earn the bronze medal (third place) in the East
Coast TEU port competition. Both New York/New Jersey and Savannah boast
advantages over Hampton Roads that have led to TEU traffic moving in their
directions.
It is difficult to say whether a carrier-oriented customer approach or a shipperoriented customer approach would generate greater throughput and stability
for a port. Much depends upon the size of the inland markets for carrier
customer ports versus the number and size of RDCs at shipper customer
ports. These in turn reflect incentives provided by states and regions, as well
as investments made by them in port and transportation infrastructure. The
Port of Hampton Roads fortuitously benefits from a naturally
deepwater channel, but there are very few other free lunches
to be had in the competition among ports.

attract a greater number of RDCs, especially in the vicinity of
the Port of Hampton Roads. For example, state economic incentives
would encourage the establishment of RDCs in cities and counties directly
adjacent to the interstate highways that surround the port. And, as noted above,
it is essential that the transportation infrastructure within Hampton Roads be
improved.
The Port of Hampton Roads already is an important economic
engine for the region. This role could become even more
important if the region and the Commonwealth are willing
to make critical, timely investments relating to the port.
Coincidentally, these investments also would make the region
more attractive to a Department of Defense that appears to
be giving increasing thought to moving assets elsewhere. A
variety of private businesses that are disadvantaged by the
region’s cul-de-sac location also would benefit. Promotion of
the Port of Hampton Roads and enhancement of the regional
infrastructure, then, are not the parochial ventures that some
critics have attempted to argue.

Since it appears that the strong promotion of one approach will not be to the
detriment of the strong promotion of the other (assuming sufficient resources are
available), a container port can thus generate a great amount of throughput
by being a strong promoter of both approaches. One of several avenues
to stimulate this development in Virginia would be to establish a VPA Client
Relations Center similar to that of the Georgia Port Authority to offer a single
contact to shipper customers of the port.
Further, in order for the Port of Hampton Roads to become
a strong promoter of the shipper customer approach for
increasing its throughput, the Commonwealth of Virginia must
be willing to provide greater economic incentives (at the levels
provided by the state of Georgia to the Port of Savannah) to
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